Collective Immortality as a Postulate for Intergenerational Justice

Written for Topics in Moral Philosophy (PHIL 9180) at Columbia University, fall 2021. Published as written, with typographical and citation corrections.

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There is a great deal of disagreement amongst scholars on the nature of Kant’s perspective of immortality and its status as a postulate of practical reason. Indeed, it would be fair to say that the old Jacobin experienced several internal revolutions on the topic during his life, with varying perspectives appearing throughout his published works and correspondence in both his pre-critical and critical periods. Many commentators share Henry Allison’s sentiment that “the whole account [of the postulate of immortality] is artificial in the extreme”¹ and the introduction of a poorly defended and relatively fluid conjecture of individual immortality is far less valuable than other aspects of Kant’s critical project. This paper intends to briefly clarify the role of immortality in Kant’s philosophy of religion and its evolution over the critical period. It argues that the final formulation of this postulate as the immortal advancement of the collective humankind toward the perfection of the moral end is a sound and helpful theory that is worthy of consideration when analyzing Kantian morality, freedom, and the “change of heart” at the center of the Religion project. Finally, the paper considers the possible infiltration of this final formulation into much of John Rawls’s work on intergenerational justice.

On the Evolution of the Postulate of Immortality

Most discussion of Kant’s philosophy of religion begins with its negativity: his criticisms against the existence of God contained in the first Critique. In line with the larger goal of epistemic limitation central to the critical project, Kant argues that our inability to cognize concerning supersensible objects leaves the question of God’s existence beyond the scope of knowledge.² His disapproval of the “famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a supreme being from mere concepts”³ then cascades into arguments against a cosmological proof (a necessary first cause). It is important to note that, despite his harsh evaluation of these popular arguments for the existence of God, he does not contradict the conclusion. Kant will eventually provide his own testament to God’s existence - and the simultaneous postulation of immortality central to this paper - in the original argument from morality described below and its revised form in the second Critique.

In the first Critique, he proposes a simple volition-driven argument for a future life. It is our “talents and impulses…concerning, above all, the moral law” that define our natural purpose, and yet the perfection of these capacities is simply impossible “in this life.”⁴ Our highest purpose is the subjection of our will to moral maxims and the connection of our reason to the moral law, yet the accomplishment of this good is supersensible and imperceptible to us. As a result:

Without a world that is invisible to us now but is hoped for, the splendid ideas of morality are indeed objects of approbation and admiration, but are not incentives for our resolve and for our carrying out of these ideas.⁵

This appeal to psychology is substantial: an agent needs the incentive of the eventual realization of her happiness and the achievement of her highest good in order to motivate continued moral action.

In the second Critique, Kant makes a few amendments, most notably being the explicit definition of the immortality of the soul as a postulate of pure practical reason and the introduction of the concept of holiness. He begins where he left off in the first Critique: “To bring about the highest good in the world is the necessary object of a will determinable by the moral law.”⁶ However, while the first Critique focused on the impossibility of the moral achievement of such a good and the requisite future life necessary for its eventual fulfillment, the second Critique accepts that such an achievement is not explicitly required. Moreover, the “complete adequacy of attitude to the moral law,” i.e., holiness, is “a perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is capable at any point of time in his existence.”⁷ Since we are incapable of recognizing our own holiness, we must live in a state of constant progression towards such perfection, and our practical reason requires the “hope for a further uninterrupted continuation of this progress, however far [our] existence may extend, even beyond this life.”⁸ Kant claims that even with the guarantee of immortality, we cannot recognize our own holiness - a sharp break from the argument presented in the first Critique where the necessity of a future life depends on the eventual (actual) realization of our happiness. Additionally, the endlessness portrayed in the second Critique is necessary for realizing our virtue and moral worthiness (deservedness) to be happy, but not happiness itself. If we were to have a concept of immortality tied to the actualization of our happiness, we would have a sensible incentive for moral action beyond the moral law and would thus not be acting virtuously.

Unfortunately, Kant’s disposition to criticism has tarnished his portrayal of immortality for many commentators. The issue is that Kant himself dismisses these formulations of the moral argument in the third Critique, and many commentators are quick to point to this reversal as indicative of Kant’s fragility concerning immortality.⁹ In a section titled “The use of the moral argument,” he writes:

What now of the hope of a future life? It is open to us to look to the final end…and to adopt it as a guiding thread for the verdict of reason concerning our vocation - a verdict which is therefore only regarded as necessary…from a practical point of view. But if, instead of so doing, we consult our faculty of theoretical knowledge,…it supplies no more than a negative conception of our thinking being…no illuminating or determining judgement…of the continuance or discontinuance of its personality after death.¹⁰

In the context of the original formation of the “moral argument” in the first Critique, it is our natural vocation to move towards a determination of our will by rational principles founded upon the moral law. Per the system of nature, we must be able to exercise our vocation to its total capacity since it is what we are naturally endowed with, so we must be guaranteed some future life since we cannot possibly perfect ourselves in this respect in a single lifetime. Kant points out in this passage that under the examination of theoretical cognition, we are left incapable of making a judgment on our own longevity and the soul’s persistence beyond the natural order.

On an initial reading, the “hope for a future life” seems pretty bleak, but the reality is not an ironic death of the postulate of immortality. Instead, this is simply Kant laying epistemic boundaries to secure the question from a theoretical debate - a strategy he utilizes throughout his critical project. “No informative judgment” can be made on either side of the question. This statement is a significant distinction because immortality is not a matter our knowledge should even be concerned with - it is a matter of faith, the establishment of which is a central component of the critical project as outlined in the first Critique. Faith is fundamental to the establishment of the moral law and the achievement of the highest good in the world, and “the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are matters of faith (res fidei) and, moreover, are of all the objects the only ones that can be so called.”¹¹ Kant reiterates this distinction in the same section of the third Critique:

[matters of faith] are ideas, that is concepts, whose objective reality cannot be guaranteed theoretically. On the other hand, the supreme final end to be realized by us…is an idea that has objective reality for us…But since we cannot procure objective reality for this concept from a theoretical point of view, it is a mere matter of faith on the part of pure reason, as are also God and immortality, the latter being the sole conditions under which…we are able to conceive the possibility of that effect of the use of our freedom according to law.¹²

Proof of a future life beyond the natural course of things is inaccessible to speculative reason and out of reach of knowledge, but certainly not beyond the scope of practical reason. We are incapable of realizing even the possibility of aligning our will and the moral law without these concepts. Without the prospect of the moral law, we would be left without any imperative on which to base our actions.

The culmination of Kant’s vision for immortality arrives, naturally, in the Religion. Having first dispensed with the existing theoretical proofs of God and immortality in the first Critique before providing his explanation dependent on faith and holiness, Kant arrives at the final stage of this evolution. In order to understand this formulation, there are several other concepts Kant introduces in the Religion, the most important being the “change of heart” where we choose morality over evil. Again, albeit unintentionally, Kant has opened himself up to criticism. If we are capable of a “moral revolution” during our life, then what need do we have for the future life and ongoing progress described in the second Critique? One can break the necessity of immortality throughout the critical project into the following stages:

1. In the first Critique, a future life serves as the period in which our happiness can be fulfilled, and we can reach the highest good since the natural order has not guaranteed such an accomplishment during our lives. This actualization serves as the achievement of the highest good.
2. In the second Critique, the future life shifts to a period in which we can continue to perfect our moral virtue and thus ever increase our worthiness to be happy.
3. In the third Critique, we cannot theorize on the perfection of our moral virtue at any point in our existence (be it in this life or the next). Instead, we need faith in immortality to even conceive of the possibility of the moral law.

In the Religion, the perfection of pure practical reason is available instantly (via the “change of heart”) and does not require endless striving; thus, personal immortality is no longer a necessary condition for one’s moral perfection. So now what? Has Kant finally resigned his first postulate of pure practical reason? No! He goes on to write:

this highest good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a whole toward that very end, [i.e.,] toward a system of well-disposed human beings…through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass.¹³

Striving towards moral perfection has now become the vocation of the human collective, and we must reinterpret the postulate of immortality as a result. As each individual persists towards their moral perfection, the collective union also moves towards that highest end. Understood in this manner, we are just as obligated to work towards the moral perfection of those around us as we are ourselves, and this seems to align with the general understanding of the moral law found throughout the critical project. The immortality of the society and constant progress towards complete determination of the collective will by the moral law serves as an excellent foundation for our ethical existence.

On the Postulate of Collective Immortality and Intergenerational Justice

Many modern ethicists, philosophers, politicians, and activists have appealed to aspects of Kantian morality when arguing against environmentally damaging construction or aggressive governmental spending. Naturally, John Rawls, one of the most prevalent authors in the field of intergenerational justice, is a self-described Kantian. It is worth noting that Rawls is one of the harshest critics of the first postulate of practical reason and does not see its utility in understanding Kantian moral philosophy.¹⁴ However, looking further, it seems that Rawls may have found value in the final postulation of collective immortality described in the previous section of this paper. His own understanding of practical faith suggests a similar appreciation for those social necessities outlined in the Religion. He writes, “while [practical faith] does not require the postulates of God and immortality, it does require certain beliefs about our nature and the social world.”¹⁵ Might these “certain beliefs” contain a belief in the possibility of collective moral improvement? Rawls continues, “[the order of nature] must contain forces and tendencies that in the longer run tend to bring out, or at least support, such a realm and to educate mankind so as to further this end.”¹⁶ Does one need to believe that this collective moral improvement extends indefinitely? Rawls completes the reiteration of Kant’s postulate of collective immortality elegantly:

We must believe, for example, that the course of human history is progressively improving, and not becoming steadily worse…By this long path we may reasonably believe a realm of ends will come about in the world.¹⁷

Despite his criticism of the postulate of immortality, it seems that Rawls has reached the same final definition as Kant and has further secured the concept from a theoretical debate.

In keeping with this section’s title, we now turn to Rawls’s theory of justice and how its discussion of intergenerational fairness stems from the understanding of immortality framed above. One intergenerational dilemma Rawls hopes to tackle is the question of a just savings principle: how might one generation of society be financially obligated to subsequent generations?¹⁸ Rawls sees this as a bellwether for more general concerns around intergenerational justice. A discussion of Rawls’s development of a just savings principle is not warranted (nor justified) in a paper on Kantian immortality. What is worth examining is the influence of the postulate of collective immortality in Rawls’s answer. Throughout his formulation, we find phrases like “natural duty to uphold and further” and “agreeing on a path over time which treats all generations justly during the whole course of a society’s history.”¹⁹ So while Rawls may have felt the postulate of immortality was too complicated to examine or too fragile to consider seriously, it seems that the collective formulation that Kant reaches in the Religion would serve well as a foundation for the moral theory Rawls sees as necessary for the just savings principle he outlines.

Final Remarks

While Kant’s perspective on immortality and its relevance to his philosophies of justice and religion fluctuated throughout his life, it does not deserve complete disregard. We should not view the changes it underwent as the internal disagreements of an unclear system, but rather the gradual evolution of a theory of immortality that would benefit Kant’s argument for the value of faith as a source of fact alongside knowledge and opinion. The eventual formulation found in the Religion stands comfortably among the themes Kant followed throughout his critical project. There are evident parallels between the second formula of the categorical imperative²⁰ and the collective will’s striving towards perfection of the moral vocation described in the first section of this paper. In this respect, it seems wrong to even entertain the abandonment thesis since Kant’s postulate of immortality only became more easily integrated throughout the critical period.

It is also problematic to neglect the postulate of collective immortality because of its practical (functional, not pragmatic) applications. Many things have changed since the 1790s. Undoubtedly, far fewer philosophers consider the concepts of God or immortality to be so vital to a theory of morality. The commandment of the moral law is no longer broadly conceived with the backdrop of a future life or Godly reward. We see this hesitancy in Rawls’s analysis of faith in Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, but also as a sentiment more generally reflected in the way we think about existence. As our cultures become more interwoven, our ethical society expands. The union that strives towards moral perfection and the realization of the final good grows. With each individual that goes through the “change of heart” and freely chooses to connect her reason to the moral law, the collective inches closer, and yet we cannot avoid the inevitable lapses of others back into evil. We cannot know whether or not we are moving forward or backward. We cannot know if we will find endless happiness or misery in some future life. All we have is faith - faith in the constant human push towards goodness. Faith that our mortality does not extend to our kindness and that what we do in this life matters.

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References

• Allison, Henry E. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
• Guyer, Paul. Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
• Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Translated by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
• Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002.
• Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason: Unified Edition. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996.
• Kant, Immanuel. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
• Kant, Immanuel. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology. Edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.
• Rawls, John, and Barbara Herman. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
• Wood, Allen W. Kant and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Footnotes

1. Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Henry Allison (1990), p. 172 ↩

2. “The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very useful idea. But this idea, precisely because it is merely that, is quite incapable of allowing us to expand, by means of it alone, our cognition regarding what exists.” Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), A602/B630 ↩

3. CPR, A602/B630 ↩

4. CPR, B425 ↩

5. CPR, A813/B841 ↩

6. Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR), 122 ↩

7. CPrR, 122 ↩

8. CPrR, 123 ↩

9. John Rawls and Paul Guyer both support this “abandonment theory,” suggesting that Kant weakens his own depictions of immortality throughout his critical project before abandoning the first postulate entirely. ↩

10. Critique of Judgement (CJ), 460 ↩

11. CJ, 469 ↩

12. CJ, 469-70 ↩

13. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (RBMR), 6:98 ↩

14. “But what is the content of practical faith once we take a realm of ends as the object of the moral law?…I suggest that…it does not require the postulates of God and immortality” Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (LHMP), p. 319 ↩

15. Rawls, LHMP, p. 319 ↩

16. Rawls, LHMP, p. 319 ↩

17. Rawls, LHMP, p. 320 ↩

18. Rawls, Theory of Justice (TJ), p. 287 ↩

19. Rawls, TJ, p. 287 ↩

20. Commonly known as the Formula of Humanity: “The practical imperative will thus be the following: So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:429 ↩